INTERNAL SITUATIONS IN COMMUNITY LAW: AN UNCERTAIN SAFEGUARD OF COMPETENCES WITHIN THE INTERNAL MARKET by Mislav Mataija
31CYELP 5 [2009] 31-63
INTERNAL SITUATIONS IN COMMUNITY LAW: 
AN UNCERTAIN SAFEGUARD OF COMPETENCES 
WITHIN THE INTERNAL MARKET 
Mislav Mataija*
Summary: This article deals with the so-called internal situation rule, 
which prevents the application of European Community law in cases 
deemed to be conﬁ ned to one Member State. Rather than focus on 
possible avenues for avoiding the ‘reverse discrimination’ against the 
actors of the regulating state (eg its own nationals) which arises be-
cause of the non-application of EC law, I assess the costs and beneﬁ ts 
of the rule directly. The approach to this problem is, ﬁ rst, to conceptu-
alise the internal situation rule as a speciﬁ c, substantive requirement 
of EC provisions that assume cross-border movement, and not as an 
overarching, general principle of EC law. With this in mind, I go on to 
claim that the rule is largely inadequate for the purpose of protecting 
Member State competences. Because the rule focuses on cross-bor-
der movement in the abstract sense, it does not clearly delineate an 
‘internal’ sphere that Member States could regulate independently. 
Next, I analyse how the case law of the European Court of Justice has 
interpreted the internal situation rule in various areas of free move-
ment law, concluding that the rule is overly formalistic and that it fails 
to distinguish between cases where there is a true impact on the in-
ternal market and those where there is not. In addition, I analyse the 
disparities in its application, arguing that they cannot be accounted 
for by the differences between, eg the free movement of goods and the 
free movement of persons. Finally, I suggest a more substantive ap-
proach to deﬁ ning internal situations, inspired in particular by public 
procurement and competition case law. Instead of looking for factual 
cross-border links, I suggest that what should be at stake is the cross-
border impact of the restriction (Member State legislation, administra-
tive measure, practice, etc) that is being challenged.
Introduction
Under normal circumstances, a national measure or practice which 
runs contrary to EC law would have to be put aside on the basis of the 
supremacy of Community law.1 In the internal market context, the Eu-
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ropean Court of Justice has used the principles of direct effect and su-
premacy to condemn a number of laws and practices which created bar-
riers to the free movement of goods, persons, services, establishment and 
capital.2 However, in some cases which are substantially related to only 
one Member State, according to the case law of the Court, there is no re-
course to these provisions. These are, according to the Court, internal sit-
uations which fall outside the scope of EC law. Individuals who have not 
exercised their right to free movement have no redress against their own 
state or other individuals, because there is no cross-border element.
Much of the scholarly writing on this topic focuses on the issue of 
the reverse discrimination which results from the application of the inter-
nal situation rule.3 Because the Community’s standard of protection for 
private persons does not apply in cases conﬁ ned to one Member State,4 
that State’s economic actors usually end up being treated less favourably 
than those of other Member States5 in a comparable situation. This is 
help in developing this paper, as well as to Professors George A Bermann, Petros Mavroi-
dis and Siniša Rodin for their insightful comments. Please direct all comments to mislav.
mataija@pravo.hr.
1 The principle of direct effect enables parties to rely on EU law directly in front of national 
courts, while the principle of supremacy makes EU law prevail over conﬂ icting national 
provisions, which have to be put aside. See, among others, B De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Su-
premacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in P Craig and G De Búrca (eds), The Evolution 
of EU Law (1999).
2  Some of the more famous examples are Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave 
Dassonville [1974] ECR 847, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung 
für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649, Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine 
degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165, Case 71/76 Jean Thieffry v Conseil 
de l’ordre des avocats à la cour de Paris [1977] ECR 765, and Case C-292/89 The Queen v 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex p Gustaff Desiderius Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745. 
3  Among others: SD Kon, ‘Aspects of Reverse Discrimination in Community Law’ (1981) 6 
EL Rev 75; A Tryfonidou, ‘Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An Incon-
gruity in a Citizens’ Europe’ (2008) 35 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 43; M Poiares 
Maduro, ‘The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal Situations and 
Reverse Discrimination’, in C Kilpatrick, T Novitz and P Skidmore (eds), The Future of Eu-
ropean Remedies (2000); E Cannizzaro, ‘Producing “Reverse Discrimination” through the 
Exercise of EC Competences’ (1997) Ybk Eur L 29.
4  Reverse discrimination is not sufﬁ cient in itself to invoke Community law, as conﬁ rmed 
recently in C-212/06 Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon 
[2008] and C-127/08 Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
[2008] (see also Maduro (n 3) p 122). In his opinion in Carbonati Apuani (Case C-72/03 
Carbonati Apuani Srl v Comune di Carrara [2004] ECR I-8027), Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro tried to extend Community law to internal situations through operation of the 
general principle of non-discrimination. If, in what he terms ‘residual situations’, reverse 
discrimination comes about as a direct result of the application of Community law against 
national legislation, it should be possible to rely on Community law. Instead of free move-
ment rules, parties should be able to invoke the principle of non-discrimination. The Court, 
however, has not followed this approach so far. 
5  The term ‘reverse discrimination’ implies that there is something back-to-front in the way 
discrimination happens. It usually happens that Member States discriminate against na-
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perceived as artiﬁ cial, unfair and somewhat odd in the context of a single 
market in which the crossing of borders is not the primary concern.
The main purpose of this article, however, is to take a step back from 
the discrimination issue and look at the internal situation rule itself. The 
ﬁ rst step will be to examine the purpose the rule should serve: safeguard-
ing Member State competences while ensuring effective regulation of the 
internal market. This will also help us understand the nature of the rule. 
Is it a general principle of EU law that one always has to bear in mind 
when deciding on the applicability of EU law? Or is it merely a step in 
the analysis of certain EU provisions which are predicated on movement? 
This article will argue that the case law of the European Court of Justice 
does not support the ﬁ rst view, even though the rule is sometimes framed 
in such a way. 
The second step of the analysis will be to examine several ways in 
which the Court has interpreted the rule in various contexts, relaxing it 
in favour of the applicability of EC law. What I hope to show is that there 
are inconsistencies in the way the internal situation rule is interpreted 
and applied. Many of the exceptions and carve-outs from the rule on in-
ternal situations have been crafted for speciﬁ c cases, but could easily be 
extended across the board.
Finally, I will attempt to build on these observations to suggest a 
different approach to identifying a situation as ‘internal’. Instead of con-
necting factors (eg the simple fact of movement between Member States), 
what should be at stake is the more substantive link of a legal situation 
with internal market rules. To suggest how such a link could be found, 
I draw inspiration from the Court’s case law on the free movement of 
goods, public procurement and competition law. This approach would 
not scrap the rule that some purely internal situations fall outside the 
scope of Community law. However, it would be more grounded in eco-
nomic reality. The mere fact that a cross-border element can be dug up 
from the facts of the case should not sufﬁ ce to bring the matter within the 
scope of Community law. The radar should be set not to catch the cross-
border elements of disputes but their impact on fundamental freedoms.
The article will proceed in three parts. Part 1 will discuss the nature 
and scope of the rule on internal situations, and their (limited) impact 
on Member State regulatory autonomy. Part 2 will outline the different 
approaches to the scope of internal market regulation adopted by the 
Court, and highlight inconsistencies. Part 3 will build on Parts 1 and 2 
tionals of other Member States. With ‘reverse’ discrimination they do the opposite. It should 
be noted, however, that the existing approach to internal situations could allow discrimina-
tion against anyone who has not engaged in cross-border movement. These may or may not 
be the economic actors a Member State might normally be interested in protecting.
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to suggest a uniﬁ ed approach to the question of which situations should 
be covered by internal market rules. This tentative solution will, however, 
stop short of addressing the second logical step, which is the issue of 
reverse discrimination: whether there is a way, within EU law, to remedy 
the unfavourable treatment suffered by those who are left outside the 
scope of the rules.6
1 Origins and nature of the internal situation rule
The history and development of the judge-made concept of internal 
situations has been explored extensively in the literature.7 For the pur-
poses of this article it is only necessary to sketch the main developments.
The ﬁ rst complete statement of the internal situation rule came in the 
ﬁ eld of the free movement of persons in the Saunders8 judgment. The Court 
stated that the purpose of Article 48 (now 39) EC is to prevent adverse 
treatment of nationals of other Member States, and that ‘the provisions 
of the Treaty on freedom of movement for workers cannot ... be applied to 
situations which are wholly internal to a Member State, in other words, 
where there is no factor connecting them to any of the situations envisaged 
by Community law.’9 In Saunders, this holding seemed to depend on the 
fact that Member State jurisdiction in criminal law was at stake.10 In sub-
sequent cases, however, the rule was applied in contexts that have nothing 
in common with traditionally sensitive areas, such as criminal law. 
The basic statement of the rule seems simple enough. If a dispute 
does not involve the cross-border exercise of market freedoms, it is nor-
mally held to be an internal situation, and Community law does not ap-
ply. In its early judgments such as Moser (persons) and Höfner (services),11 
the Court labelled situations internal even if home country nationals were 
potentially deterred from exercising their free movement rights. What was 
required was actual movement, or an actual cross-border element. Later 
on, the Court relaxed this requirement and made it more complex.12
Before examining these developments, however, it is necessary to 
think about why the rule even exists and how it should be assessed.
6  For some well argued proposals, see Maduro and Tryfonidou (n 3).
7  Apart from the works cited in n 3, see NN Shuibhne, ‘Free Movement of Persons and the 
Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 731.
8  Case 175/78 The Queen v Vera Ann Saunders [1979] ECR 1129.
9  Saunders (n 8) para 11.
10  Saunders (n 8) para 10. See Shuibhne (n 7) 774-775.
11  Case 180/83 Hans Moser v Land Baden-Württemberg [1984] ECR 2539; Case C-41/90 
Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979.
12  See section 2 for some examples.
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1.1 Underlying values: safeguarding competences and making the 
internal market effective
The Treaties set up an elaborate system dividing competences be-
tween the Union and its Member States. Instruments such as the princi-
ples of conferred powers, subsidiarity and proportionality13 are meant to 
protect Member States from the Community’s regulatory overreach.
The internal situation rule has been developed by the European 
Court of Justice with the same values in mind, attempting to determine 
the proper scope of the internal market provisions of the EC Treaty and 
the amount of elbow room they leave to Member States. The case law on 
internal situations narrows the scope of EC provisions by excluding cases 
which seem to have little to do with the internal market, allowing Member 
States to subject these situations entirely to their own law. 
At a very general level, this proposition seems legitimate. It cannot 
be seriously argued that EC rules (or, for that matter, any legal rules) ap-
ply to cases which factually do not relate to them. The internal situation 
rule cannot, however, be assessed only from the point of view of Member 
State competences. There is something else at the other end of the scale: 
the unity and effectiveness of the internal market.
Indeed, this is the balance that the Court’s internal market case law 
has sought to strike over the years. The Court has at times stretched the 
meaning of the EC Treaty’s internal market provisions in order to promote 
the integration of the internal market,14 while narrowing it when its impact 
on Member States’ ability to regulate seemed too severe.15 The internal 
situation rule is one of the tools used by the Court to strike this balance 
by excluding from the analysis those cases which ‘have no factor linking 
them with any of the situations governed by Community law and which are 
conﬁ ned in all relevant respects within a single Member State’.16 
13  All three principles are covered by Article 5 of the EC Treaty. See also, eg, GA Bermann, 
‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United 
States’ (1994) 2 Colum L Rev 331; A Dashwood, ‘The Relationship Between the Member 
States and the European Union/European Community’ (2004) CMLR 355; G Davies, ‘Sub-
sidiarity: the Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time’ (2006) CML Rev 63. 
14  The judgments in Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] 
ECR 847 and Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
[1979] ECR 649 are the most often cited examples. 
15  Famously, the Court’s carve-out of ‘certain selling arrangements’ from the application of 
Article 28 EC in Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal proceedings against Ber-
nard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 para 16 can be seen in this light. 
16  Joined cases C-95/99 to C-98/99 and C-180/99 Mervett Khalil (C-95/99), Issa Chaaban 
(C-96/99) and Hassan Osseili (C-97/99) v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit and Mohamad Nasser 
(C-98/99) v Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart and Meriem Addou (C-180/99) v Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen [2001] ECR I-7413 para 69.
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This wording, repeated in almost all cases invoking the internal situ-
ation rule, clearly leaves room for questions. What conﬁ nes a case to a 
single Member State, and which elements are relevant in this respect? 
Does the fact that a case is conﬁ ned within a Member State sufﬁ ce, or 
can there still be certain ‘factors’ which can bring even internal cases 
within the scope of Community law?17 If the latter is true, what kind of 
factors?
An attempt to answer these questions must use as a benchmark the 
competing values of integration of the internal market and the regulatory 
autonomy of the Member States. How does the internal situation rule 
advance these two interests?
1.2 A general principle or a speciﬁ c substantive requirement?
Certainly, Member States have a legitimate interest in removing cer-
tain cases from the application of Community law. The question is, how-
ever, not only which cases can be removed, but also: how useful is the 
internal situation rule, as devised by the Court, in protecting this legiti-
mate interest in the ﬁ rst place? 
To answer this question, it is ﬁ rst necessary to consider the nature 
of the rule. Is it so general that a ‘connecting factor’ must be found in all 
cases where Community law could be invoked, or does it only arise be-
cause of the substantive content of certain Community provisions? More 
speciﬁ cally, is it true that Community law does not apply whenever a 
case is conﬁ ned to one Member State?
The non-applicability of Community law to situations conﬁ ned within 
one Member State, with no ‘foreign’ or ‘cross-border’ elements, is some-
times understood as a general proposition of EU law. Eleftheriadis, for 
example, argues that the public law of the EU, as a whole, ‘does not apply 
to purely internal situations according to the allocation of competences 
determined by the treaties’.18 Advocate General Tizzano has termed this a 
‘principle according to which Community law does not apply to situations 
in which the key elements are purely internal to a Member State’.19 
There are more nuanced approaches as well. Maduro has argued 
that there are two variables which bring a situation within the scope of 
17  AG Sharpston in Case C-212/06 Government of Communauté française and Gou-
vernement wallon v Gouvernement ﬂ amand, nyr (28 June 2007), paras 134-136, seems to 
understand these as two separate requirements which need to be fulﬁ lled cumulatively in 
order for a purely internal case to fall outside the scope of Community law.
18  P Eleftheriadis, ‘The Idea of a European Constitution’ (2007) 27 OJLS 1, 15.
19  Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-209/01 Theodor Schilling and Angelica 
Fleck-Schilling v Finanzamt Nürnberg-Süd [2003] ECR I-13389 para 83.
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Community law: the degree of legal integration and the existence of a 
cross-border element.20 If the depth of integration is sufﬁ ciently great, 
such as in gender discrimination law, there is no further discussion of 
internal situations. If this is not the case, cross-border elements will be 
decisive. While noting some areas in which cross-border elements are not 
decisive, this approach also views the internal situation rule as implicit 
in all cases where Community law might be applied.21 
On the other hand, it is also possible to link the internal situation 
rule only to those provisions of Community law which imply some sort 
of cross-border element, or at least some impact on cross-border trade. 
Rather than being an overarching principle of Community law, this view 
would suggest the rule is no more than an element in the analysis of 
Treaty free-movement rules and secondary legislation implementing 
them. Such a conclusion is based on two points. 
First, the general nature of the rule is disproved by its complete, not 
entirely explained, absence from areas such as gender discrimination 
and product liability. Second, it is not necessary to construe the rule in a 
general way, because its importance in preserving Member State regula-
tory autonomy is limited.
1.2.1 Areas where the rule is not applied
The fact that there is no overarching principle exempting internal 
situations from the scope of Community law is apparent from areas 
where the distinction between internal and external situations could be 
drawn, but is not. 
1.2.1.1 Gender discrimination
An often discussed example is gender equality law, where one could 
easily imagine ‘internal situations’. Nowhere in the Court’s numerous 
judgments is a cross-border element discussed. A worker can claim his 
or her Community law right to equal pay, fair working conditions or ac-
cess to employment, even in a completely internal situation (even if both 
the worker and the employer are conﬁ ned to a single Member State in all 
their relevant activities).22
20  Maduro (n 3) 120-123.
21  See also Shuibhne (n 7) 750.
22  Some examples are Case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, Case 170/84 Bilka - Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber 
von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607, and Case 109/88 Handels-og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund I 
Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening acting on behalf of Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199.
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This could be explained by any number of differences between gender 
equality law and free movement law, including the fact that the former is 
not primarily economic in nature. Still, a clear line between the two ﬁ elds 
is difﬁ cult to draw. Firstly, an economic rationale was used for the ﬁ rst 
explicit Treaty provision on gender equality and the Court has spoken of 
the dual nature of equality - social and economic.23 Therefore, notions of 
cross-border competition are inherent to matters of equality as well, and 
not only to free movement cases.24 Secondly, the Court has justiﬁ ed the 
direct effect of Article 39 EC (relating to the free movement of persons) on 
similar grounds to that of Article 141 EC (relating to gender equality).25 
Thirdly, cases of discrimination against workers argued in the context 
of Article 39, which clearly imply an internal situation rule, can be dis-
tinguished from gender cases only on the grounds of discrimination.26 It 
seems odd that workers mistreated on the basis of gender are preferred 
to victims of nationality-based discrimination.
However, the internal situation argument is not raised in gender 
discrimination cases. The question is why, if there is truly a ‘principle 
according to which Community law does not apply to situations in which 
the key elements are purely internal to a Member State’?27
The most plausible answer is simply that neither Article 141 EC 
nor secondary law adopted on its basis require a cross-border element 
in order to apply. It follows that the internal situation rule has roots in 
the substantive content of free movement provisions, not in the general 
23  Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena 
[1976] ECR 455 paras 9-12. 
24  Another difference between non-discrimination and free movement provisions of the 
EC Treaty is that the former have traditionally been viewed as directly effective in disputes 
between individuals (so-called ‘horizontal direct effect’) whereas the latter were seen as jus-
ticiable only against the state (vertical direct effect). However, all of the free movement pro-
visions have been declared directly effective between individuals in certain circumstances 
(among others, see Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association 
ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and 
Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR 
I-4921; Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR 
I-4139; Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s 
Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779; and Case C-341/05 
Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetare-
förbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767) 
except free movement of goods (although even here actions of individuals can be challenged 
because of the state’s failure to prevent them, as in Case C-265/95 Commission v France 
[1997] ECR I-6959). 
25  Shuibhne (n 7) 735. 
26  Case C-237/94 John O’Flynn v Adjudication Ofﬁ cer [1996] ECR I-2617 para 18 is an 
example of a case on migrant workers which extensively uses the legal vocabulary of dis-
crimination.
27  See n 18.
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principles of Community law. This conclusion is also supported by the 
Court’s case law on product liability and the common organisation of 
markets.
1.2.1.2 The question of harmonisation 
If an area is harmonised at the European level, again there does not 
seem to be room for invoking the internal situation argument. An exam-
ple is product liability, regulated by Directive 85/374.28 In cases such as 
González Sánchez and Veedfald,29 the disputes did not seem to involve 
any cross-border element, as they were between private economic actors 
located within one Member State.30 Nevertheless, the Court applied the 
Directive. Why is the internal situation argument never made? 
One answer is that the Directive is one of complete harmonisation, 
having been adopted under (now) Article 94 EC, which ‘provides no possi-
bility for the Member States to maintain or establish provisions departing 
from Community harmonizing measures’.31 If a ﬁ eld is completely har-
monised, Member States cannot adopt divergent measures, less or more 
stringent for producers, granting fewer or more rights. This is presum-
ably why Community law applies to internal situations as well. 
Is this convincing? Just because the hands of Member States are 
tied in situations falling under the scope of a directive, it does not mean 
that purely internal situations have to be caught by the directive. There-
fore, one might imagine a cross-border requirement being pinned on cas-
es such as Gonzalez Sanchez as well. But here, just as in cases of gender 
discrimination, the argument does not come up.
Moreover, even harmonisation under Article 95 EC (requiring a less 
stringent procedure than Article 94 EC) seems to exclude the internal 
situation argument. This was conﬁ rmed by the Court, in the context of 
the Data Protection Directive,32 in Rundfunk and Lindqvist. According to 
28  Council Directive 85/374/EEC [1985] OJ L 210.
29  Case C-183/00 María Victoria González Sánchez v Medicina Asturiana SA [2003] ECR II-
135 and Case C-203/99 Henning Veedfald v Århus Amtskommune [2001] ECR I-3569. See 
also Case C-402/03 Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S [2006] ECR I-199.
30  In Veedfald, the Directive’s rules on product liability were applied to the following facts: a 
Danish man was to receive a kidney transplant from a public (and publicly-funded) hospital 
in Denmark, for which he paid no remuneration. The operation was unsuccessful because 
a defective ﬂ uid, produced by another public hospital in Denmark, was used to treat the 
kidney. Clearly, there is no cross-border movement, and arguably no effect whatsoever on 
the internal market. 
31  González Sánchez (n 29) para 23.
32  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data [1995] OJ L281.
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the Court, showing a link to free movement is not necessary in individual 
cases arising under Article 95 measures, because this could ‘make the 
limits of the ﬁ eld of application of the directive particularly unsure and 
uncertain, which would be contrary to its essential objective of approxi-
mating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Mem-
ber States’.33 In light of all the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent 
in the internal situation rule, one might ask if the limits of application of 
Community law are any less uncertain in cases arising under the Treaty 
rather than Article 95 harmonisation measures? Why does positive inte-
gration (ie harmonisation) automatically apply to situations that negative 
integration (ie the removal of restrictive Member State measures) cannot 
reach?
Another area in which there is no mention of the internal situation 
rule is the common market organisation for various agricultural prod-
ucts.34 The Common Agricultural Policy is meant to ‘ensure conditions 
for trade within the Community similar to those existing in a national 
market’ (Article 37(3) EC). This requires its extension to all producers, re-
gardless of any cross-border element. Again, cross border competition is 
implicit, but the internal situation argument does not appear in speciﬁ c 
cases before the Court.35
1.2.1.3 Interim conclusion
Clearly, there are at least four articles in the EC Treaty (Articles 
37, 94, 95, 141)36 which allow the EC to regulate internal situations.37 
This seems proof enough that the internal situation rule is not a general, 
structural requirement necessary to invoke EU law. It is merely a re-
quirement linked to the content of only those EC provisions that involve 
a cross-border element. Thus, when the argument is made that a situ-
33  Case C-101/01 Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12971 paras 
40-41; Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and 
Others [2003] ECR I-4989 paras 41-42.
34  Maduro (n 20).
35  For a recent example, see Case C-208/01 Isabel Parras Medina and Adelina Parras Me-
dina v Consejería de Agricultura y Medio Ambiente de la Junta de Comunidades de Castilla-
La Mancha [2002] ECR I-8955.
36  Regarding common market organisation, approximation of laws and the equal treatment 
of men and women respectively. 
37  One could go even further and point to examples such as political rights linked to Union 
citizenship, eg petitioning the European Parliament or participating in local elections in a 
place of residence, granted directly by the Treaty (arts 19-21 EC). Clearly, Member States 
would be in direct violation of the Treaty were they to obstruct these rights to any Union 
citizen, and the internal situation argument would not be helpful. This paper, however, 
focuses on areas that can be compared more directly with those in which the internal situ-
ation rule does appear.
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ation falls outside the scope of EU law, it is because of the substantive 
content of the rule in question, and not because of a general principle of 
Community law. 
1.3 The internal situation rule and Member State competences
The internal situation rule is generally viewed as a safeguard of 
Member State competences. According to Ritter, ‘it makes sense for the 
Member States to retain competence over their purely internal sphere - if 
only because they may wish to regulate their respective societies on the 
basis of policy goals other than the narrow list of public order objectives 
set out in the Treaty’.38
While the general sentiment is hard to criticise, when one gets down 
to the nuts and bolts of it, this idea becomes questionable. In order for 
the internal situation rule to genuinely protect Member State competenc-
es, one would need to deﬁ ne a clear class of subject matter or persons 
which the Member States could regulate exclusively (their ‘purely inter-
nal sphere’, as Ritter terms it). The deﬁ nition of internal situations, how-
ever, does not allow this.
The problem is that none of the factors which link a speciﬁ c case to 
one and only one Member State, not even nationality or place of estab-
lishment, sufﬁ ces in itself to make a situation internal. Rather, it is the 
actual or possible exercise of market freedoms that triggers the applica-
tion of Community law. What the Court seems to focus on, therefore, 
are not so much the parties or the dispute, but movement itself in the 
abstract sense. 
Consequently, Member States are not free to treat, eg, their nation-
als or residents in any way they want, escaping liability under EU law. It 
is clear that individuals can claim rights arising from their status as EU 
citizens,39 or the right of establishment (as long as they are in a situation 
‘equivalent to that of any other person enjoying the rights and liberties 
guaranteed by the Treaty’),40 even against their Member State of origin.
38  C Ritter, ‘Purely Internal Situations, Reverse Discrimination, Guimont, Dzodzi and Arti-
cle 234’ (2006) 31 EL Rev 690, 701.
39  Joined cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Rhiannon Morgan v Bezirksregierung Köln (C-11/06) 
and Iris Bucher v Landrat des Kreises Düren (C-12/06) [2007] ECR I-9161 para 22; Case C-
192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas [2006] ECR I-10451 para 19. For a different view, see S Besson 
and A Utzinger, ‘Introduction: Future Challenges of European Citizenship - Facing a Wide-
Open Pandora’s Box’ (2007) 13 Eur LJ 573, 583.
40  Case C-107/94 PH Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1996] ECR I-3089 para 
32, Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR 
I-6279 para 23.
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Even though the Court made such a statement as early as in Knoors,41 
confusion sometimes remains. A good example is 3 Glocken.42 In this case, 
the Court proclaimed Italian legislation restricting the marketing of pasta 
contrary to Article 28 EC. In an obiter dictum, however, the Court stated 
that Italy is still free to impose the legislation on pasta manufacturers 
‘established in Italy.’43 In the more recent case of Granarolo, AG Léger 
proposed a similar solution, saying that the legislation is contrary to EC 
law only with respect to foreign producers or goods produced abroad, and 
not to producers established in Italy or goods produced in Italy.44 
There are serious difﬁ culties with this line of reasoning. First of all, 
the signiﬁ cance of place of establishment is questionable. Even if a com-
pany is established in Italy, it might still for example be producing goods 
elsewhere and exporting them to Italy. Place of establishment is not de-
terminative of the ‘internal’ status of a situation: rather, what counts is 
the occurrence of (or the potential for) movement in a particular case. A 
regulatory requirement can only be imposed on cases of, eg pasta pro-
duced in Italy by an Italian company, and sold only on the Italian mar-
ket.45 Of course, if the Community issue expressly turns on nationality 
as such, nationality could possibly keep the case outside the scope of 
Community law.46 But this is only the result of the speciﬁ c substantive 
content of the rule which is questioned. 
In addition, the internal situation rule is not effective in reserving a 
sphere of sovereignty that Member States can rely on. It is only possible 
for them to adopt legislation excluding situations where it is clear that 
there is no cross-border element whatsoever. Engineering such a provi-
sion can be a difﬁ cult, if not impossible task.47 
41  Case 115/78 J Knoors v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken [1979] ECR 399.
42  Case 407/85 3 Glocken GmbH and Gertraud Kritzinger v USL Centro-Sud and Provincia 
autonoma di Bolzano [1988] ECR 4233.
43  3 Glocken (n 42) para 25.
44  Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-294/01 Granarolo SpA v Comune di Bologna [2003] ECR 
I-13429 para 82. Interestingly, the Court in the same case did not use the internal situation 
argument at all, simply saying that the national legislation is contrary to Article 28.
45  Even then, one could say that there might be a cross-border element. What if pre-proc-
essed milk (in a case such as Granarolo) is acquired, as an input, from farmers from other 
Member States? In that case, a regulatory requirement on the ﬁ nal product would reduce 
market access for the input - in this case, milk. 
46  This might have been the case in Case C-127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and Others 
v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, nyr (25 July 2008), had the applicants’ 
spouses been Irish nationals, since the Directive explicitly gave rights only to nationals of 
other Member States. 
47  Shuibhne (n 7) in n 42.
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Because the internal situation rule focuses simply on movement in 
the abstract sense, it does not aid the preservation of Member State com-
petences even where those competences are exclusive. A good example 
is the judgment in Tas-Hagen.48 Not only were the applicants Dutch citi-
zens, but the Court held that the legislation they challenged (granting a 
beneﬁ t to civilian war victims) falls within exclusive Member State com-
petence. Neither of these two factors, however, served to make the case 
‘purely internal’, simply because there was some cross-border element 
(the applicants were denied the beneﬁ t as a result of moving to Spain).49 
This example shows that the policy space left to Member States 
thanks to the internal situation rule is only vaguely related to the pro-
tection of their competences. Member States are not allowed to reserve 
- as such - certain classes of persons or production factors they might 
have an interest in regulating (eg citizens, residents, products). They can 
merely carve out speciﬁ c situations in which no cross-border element 
exists, depending on the content of the EU provisions. To avoid the ap-
plication of EC law in Tas-Hagen, the Netherlands would have had to 
predict all the situations where somebody’s exercise of free movement 
might make them worse off in the context of Dutch law, and provide for 
a different legal regime for them. Even if such legislative distinctions can 
be drafted, because of their factually contingent, even arbitrary nature, 
they do not effectively protect Member State competences.50 
2 Internal situations and free movement 
After looking at the internal situation rule from the point of view of 
Member State competences, it remains to be seen what its costs and ben-
eﬁ ts are for internal market regulation.
As far as the internal market is concerned, the measure of success 
of the internal situation rule should be how well it distinguishes between 
cases where there is an adverse impact on trade which Community law 
should prohibit, and cases where trade is only marginally affected and 
the disputed measure or activity can be tolerated. The case law does not 
perform this task well either.
48  Case C-192/05 K Tas-Hagen and R.A Tas v Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen-en 
Uitkeringsraad [2006] ECR I-10451.
49  Most recently, in Case C-40/05 Kaj Lyyski v Umeå universitet [2007] ECR I-99, it was 
conﬁ rmed that Member States lose exclusive competence over their nationals or residents 
as soon as they exercise one of the fundamental freedoms: ‘any Community national who, 
irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised that right ... falls 
within the scope of that article’ (para 30). 
50  The ease of using such a measure again depends on the speciﬁ c nature of the Commu-
nity measure. If, for example, a directive itself applies only to nationals of other Member 
States, the line could be easily drawn by the legislator. This, however, only reinforces the 
nature of the internal situation rule.
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As others have pointed out, in the context of a single internal market, 
deﬁ ned by Article 14(2) EC as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’, the 
application of Community law should not simply depend upon the cross-
ing of borders.51 One could easily imagine cases where the cross-border 
requirement is fulﬁ lled, but which still do not call for the application of 
Community law, and vice versa. 
In addition, the Court’s case law has been less than consistent on 
what constitutes an internal situation and what does not. The only thing 
that can be concluded with some certainty is that some sort of cross-bor-
der element needs to be found in order to apply free movement rules. This, 
however, as pointed out by Pickup,52 only begs the question: who has to 
move and when? It is not clear which elements can be taken into account 
and which of them will sufﬁ ce. Moreover, the Court’s interpretation varies 
according to the legal provision, so that the deﬁ nition of internal cases in 
the areas of free movement of persons, goods etc is not uniform. 
I will proceed by examining the Court’s approach to deﬁ ning the 
internal situation rule. This case law, which has generally made it easier 
to invoke Community law, can be broadly divided into two groups. The 
ﬁ rst group brings a greater number of situations under the umbrella of 
Community law by ﬁ nding a cross-border element with relative ease. The 
second group goes a step further by extending Community law even to 
seemingly internal cases, where the disputed measure or activity as such 
has cross-border implications.
2.1 Extending the links with cross-border movement
2.1.1 Free movement of persons - relaxing the ‘who’ and ‘when’ of 
movement
Free movement of persons is an area in which the nature of the 
‘links’ necessary for the situation to come under the scope of Community 
law has become increasingly complex.53 Even though some movement is 
normally required in order to fall under the scope of Article 39 EC (re-
garding the free movement of workers) or provisions of secondary law, it 
is not necessary for the case to arise directly out of any actual cross-bor-
der movement of the parties. In fact, the cross-border movement that is 
required may be only very indirectly linked to the case at hand. 
51  AG Sharpston in C-212/06 (n 17) para 116.
52  DMW Pickup, ‘Reverse Discrimination and Freedom of Movement for Workers’ (1986) 23 
CML Rev 135, 156.
53  The case law has been explored in more detail elsewhere. See eg Shuibhne (n 7), Pickup 
(n 52), Tryfonidou (n 3).
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Firstly, the movement could have happened in the past. If a person 
had previously used the right to free movement, the situation falls under 
Community law. Thus, migrant workers are granted certain rights even 
after the end of their employment relationship.54 
Secondly, even if the movement was not directly linked to the case at 
hand, and the situation is otherwise internal, the cross-border require-
ment is fulﬁ lled as long as the exercise of movement puts a party at a 
disadvantage.55 
Thirdly, one persons’ exercise of cross-border movement can fulﬁ l 
the requirement of movement for someone else - usually a family mem-
ber. In Schempp, the fact that the applicant’s ex-wife had moved to Spain 
triggered the application of Articles 12 and 18 EC,56 because it adversely 
affected the applicant’s right to deduct the maintenance payments he 
paid to her in his tax returns. 
Fourthly, sometimes the cross-border criterion does not have to in-
volve any movement at all, at least not in the literal sense. In Commission 
v Spain (C-286/06),57 a Spaniard was able to rely on EC law against the 
Spanish administration in order to seek recognition of a professional de-
gree, even though he studied in Spain. What made the situation ‘external’ 
was the fact that an Italian university had issued the diploma, and the 
applicant was therefore entitled to work in Italy. In Zhu and Chen, the 
Court held that the mother of a child born in Northern Ireland is able to 
rely on EC law on her daughter’s behalf in front of courts in the United 
Kingdom, solely on the basis of the daughter’s Irish nationality (acquired 
thanks to the ius soli principle), despite the fact that neither of them had 
actually moved between two Member States.58 
Finally, sometimes the mere fact that a national measure deterred 
a person from exercising free movement rights will sufﬁ ce to fulﬁ l the 
cross-border requirement. Some of these judgments will be reviewed be-
low in more detail, since they are the strongest example of the Court’s 
willingness to interpret the internal situation rule widely.
54  See eg the judgment in Case C-57/96 H Meints v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer 
en Visserij [1997] ECR I-6689 para 40; Shuibhne (n 7) 743.
55  Joined cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Rhiannon Morgan v Bezirksregierung Köln (C-11/06) 
and Iris Bucher v Landrat des Kreises Düren (C-12/06) [2007] ECR I-9161 para 25. See also 
Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947 para 39 and Case C-192/05 K Tas-Hagen 
and RA Tas v Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen-en Uitkeringsraad [2006] ECR I-10451 
para 31.
56  Case C-403/03 Egon Schempp v Finanzamt München V [2005] ECR I-6421 paras 22-25.
57  Case C-286/06 Commission v Spain, nyr (23 October 2008), para 67.
58  Case C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2004] ECR I-9925 para 19.
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2.1.2 The criterion of deterrence
Cases dealing with free movement of persons usually involve more 
than purely economic considerations, as personal relationships and fam-
ily life can be affected. Appealing to Community rights of movement is of-
ten the only choice for people facing deportation or separation from their 
families. Therefore, Community law arguments tend to come up quite 
frequently even in seemingly internal cases. 
The Court could have attempted to apply Community law in ‘inter-
nal’ cases by appealing directly to fundamental rights, such as those en-
shrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, or to the general 
principle of non-discrimination. Instead, the case law has relied heavily 
on a rather wide interpretation of cross-border elements. 
In Singh,59 an Indian claiming the right of residence in the UK came 
within the scope of Articles 39 (free movement of persons) and 43 EC 
(establishment of self-employed persons). His wife, a UK national, had 
previously worked in other Member States, and he had accompanied her 
there. According to the Court, allowing the UK to deny him the right of 
residence would deter his wife from exercising her free movement rights. 
This was enough to fulﬁ l the cross-border requirement.60
However, the link between Mrs Singh’s previous work abroad and 
her husband’s later right of residence in the UK is less than clear. It is 
hard to see how Mrs Singh was deterred from moving abroad when the 
rights of Mr and Mrs Singh were, strictly speaking, not affected by their 
exercise of cross-border movement.61 A similar approach, raising similar 
difﬁ culties, was applied again quite recently in Eind.62
59  Case C-370/90 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal et Surinder Singh ex p Secretary 
of State for Home Department [1992] ECR I-4265. On Singh, see RCA White ‘A Fresh Look at 
Reverse Discrimination’ (1993) 18 EL Rev 527. 
60  Mr Singh’s movement from India to the UK, according to previous judgments, would not 
have been relevant. See Joined cases 35 and 36/82 Elestina Esselina Christina Morson v 
State of the Netherlands and Head of the Plaatselijke Politie within the meaning of the Vreem-
delingenwet; Sweradjie Jhanjan v State of the Netherlands [1982] ECR 3723 paras 15-17.
61  See Maduro (n 3) 124-125. This problem arose several years later in Akrich (Case C-
109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Hacene Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607). 
In this case, the Court held that there is no deterrence to movement if the spouse, who is 
not an EU citizen, had no residence rights prior to moving to another Member State, under 
Article 10 of Regulation No 1612/68 (paras 52-54). However, quite recently, in Metock (n 4) 
the Court explicitly reconsidered this view, stating: ‘The refusal of the host Member State to 
grant rights of entry and residence to the family members of a Union citizen is such as to 
discourage that citizen from moving to or residing in that Member State, even if his family 
members are not already lawfully resident in the territory of another Member State’ (para 
64).
62  Case C-291/05 Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v RNG Eind [2007] ECR 
I-10719. In this case, an underage daughter, a third country national, was held to have a 
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The stretching of the criteria went even further in Carpenter,63 where 
a Philippine national fought a deportation order by invoking her hus-
band’s right to provide services. The Court accepted this argument: 
It is clear that the separation of Mr. and Mrs. Carpenter would be 
detrimental to their family life and, therefore, to the conditions under 
which Mr. Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom. That freedom 
could not be fully effective if Mr. Carpenter were to be deterred from 
exercising it by obstacles raised in his country of origin to the entry 
and residence of his spouse.64
The case turned on the economic cross-border link necessary to in-
voke Article 49, even if the Court went on to examine the UK’s justiﬁ cation 
in trying to deport Mrs Carpenter in light of the fundamental right to fam-
ily life (citing Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights).65
 There are two difﬁ culties with the Court’s liberal approach to ﬁ nding 
a cross-border element in cases such as Singh and Carpenter. First, by 
using the provision of services or employment in another Member State 
as the predominant criteria, the Court adopts an indirect and second-
best solution to what is actually at stake: the right to family life. This 
emphasises what has been termed the ‘instrumental’ nature of human 
rights protection within the context of internal market law.66
Second, were the Court to apply the same standard consistently, es-
pecially outside of the context of free movement of persons, there would 
be far-reaching consequences. The implications of Carpenter are particu-
larly important, because of the ease with which a cross-border element is 
found in the provision of services.67 As outlined by AG Léger in Wouters: 
right to join her father in his Member State of origin even though she had no right to reside 
there under national law, and even though her father was not engaged in any economic 
activity there (but had been working in another Member State previously). Again, the Court 
relied on deterrence as the reason for applying Community law. This deterrence would come 
about ‘simply from the prospect, for that same national, of not being able, on returning 
to his Member State of origin, to continue living together with close relatives, a way of life 
which may have come into being in the host Member State as a result of marriage or family 
reuniﬁ cation’ (para 36).
63  Carpenter (n 40). See also A Tryfonidou, ‘Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department: The Beginning of a New Era in the European Union’ (2003) 14 King’s 
College Law Journal 81.
64  Carpenter (n 40) para 39.
65  Carpenter (n 40) para 41. See also X Groussot, ‘UK Immigration Law Under Attack and 
the Direct Application of Article 8 ECHR by the ECJ’ (2003) 3 Non-state Actors and Inter-
national Law 187.
66  Tryfonidou (n 3) 61. 
67  This is far from saying that internal situations do not exist in the area of free provision 
of services. See eg Case C-97/98 Peter Jägerskiöld v Torolf Gustafsson [1999] ECR I-7319 
paras 42-43 and Joined cases C-317/01 and C-369/01 Eran Abatay and Others (C-317/01) 
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‘there is no need for the provider or recipient of services to move within 
the Community. The link to Community law may be found in the mere 
movement of the service concerned’.68 Moreover, there is also a right to 
receive services, either from across a border (eg by watching television 
or using online services) or by travelling abroad (eg as a tourist).69 It is 
hard to imagine a person living in an EU Member State who does not at 
least occasionally receive a cross-border service.70 Were the Court to ex-
tend Carpenter to recipients of services, almost anyone (and their spouse) 
could fulﬁ l the cross-border requirement and challenge any number of 
national laws and practices as a matter of Community law.
2.1.3 Citizenship of the EU - high hopes, little effect
Citizenship of the EU, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht and 
accorded great importance by a series of judgments, has been used re-
peatedly as an argument in favour of removing the internal situation rule 
completely and putting an end to reverse discrimination . The Court’s 
holding in Grzelczyk that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the funda-
mental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who ﬁ nd 
themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irre-
spective of their nationality’,71 made the cross-border requirement seem 
almost redundant. 
EU citizenship is important because the movement rights it grants 
are not tied only to work or economic activity.72 On this basis, it has 
been argued that ‘the requirement that someone must leave their Mem-
ber State in order to trigger the advantages of Community law, viewed 
against strenuous Community promotion of common citizenship bonds, 
seems ... to make less sense than ever.’73 
and Nadi Sahin (C-369/01) v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [2003] ECR 12301 paras 107-108.
68  Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-309/99 JCJ Wouters, JW Savelbergh and Price Water-
house Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 
intervener: Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap [2002] ECR I-1577 para 240. 
Thus, even the possibility that services may be provided to citizens of or persons established 
in other Member States would sufﬁ ce. In the judgment, the Court did not even dwell on the 
issue. It proceeded to examine the legality of the measures at hand in light of Article 49, 
ﬁ nding them justiﬁ ed under the Treaty exceptions.
69  Joined cases 286/82 and 26/83 Graziana Luisi and Giuseppe Carbone v Ministero del 
Tesoro [1984] ECR 377 para 16.
70  Ritter (n 38) 693.
71  Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-
Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193 para 31.
72  Art 18 (1) of EC Treaty.
73  Shuibhne (n 7) 757. See also Tryfonidou (n 3) 61-62.
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The Court has, however, been less than responsive to such claims. 
In Uecker and Jacquet, it held that EU citizenship was not meant to ‘ex-
tend the material scope of the Treaty to internal situations which have 
no link with Community law’.74 Admittedly, EU citizenship has made it 
easier for the Court to uphold some actions of private parties against 
their own Member State, either because they were penalised because 
they exercised free movement rights or because they were deterred from 
doing so.75 However, the cross-border requirement is still present.
The latest statements of the internal situation rule in citizenship 
cases came in French community and Walloon government vs Flemish gov-
ernment and Metock.76 In both cases, it was reiterated that EU citizenship 
cannot affect the scope of the Treaty in relation to internal situations. 
Therefore, citizenship does not in itself change the interpretation as far 
as internal situations are concerned.77 
2.2 A step further - cross-border implications of restrictive 
activities
2.2.1 Free movement of goods
As we have seen, some judgments in the area of free movement of 
persons have found a cross-border element with relative ease. Case law 
on the free movement of goods goes a step further by focusing on general 
or potential cross-border implications of restrictive measures rather than 
the occurrence or possibility of movement in a speciﬁ c case.
On the face of it, Treaty rules on the free movement of goods seem to 
have a clear scope of application. Unlike in free movement of persons, for 
example, EC Treaty provisions in this area are linked to trade between 
Member States, not within the internal market generally.78 Nevertheless, 
the Court has stretched the cross-border requirement in this context as 
well. The criteria which were applied, however, were rather different. 
74  Joined cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Kari Uecker and Vera 
Jacquet v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR I-3171 para 23.
75  Morgan (n 39) para 26.
76  Metock (n 4) and C-212/06 (n 17). 
77  What it might achieve, however, is to affect the problem of reverse discrimination. Al-
though the Court explicitly rejected the notion that reverse discrimination can be addressed 
at the EU level, it did point out, in a rather offhand way, that the European Convention on 
Human Rights could be relevant in such cases. Time will tell whether the Court did so in 
order to open the door to a more ambitious future holding on reverse discrimination.
78  Thus they state: ‘prohibition between Member States of customs duties on imports and 
exports and of all charges having equivalent effect’ (art 23 EC, similarly in art 25 EC, em-
phasis added); ‘quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent 
effect shall be prohibited between Member States’ (art 28 EC, emphasis added; the same 
language is in art 29 EC with regard to exports). 
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In its case law, the Court started by refusing to extend the protec-
tion of rules relating to the free movement of goods to internal situations, 
such as domestically produced goods (Mathot).79 In Anomar, the Court 
clariﬁ ed this point, saying that trade-restrictive legislation ‘may gener-
ally fall within the scope of the provisions on the fundamental freedoms 
established by the Treaty only to the extent that it applies to situations 
related to intra-Community trade’.80
This case law has been loosened in two directions: ﬁ rst, in cases 
where there are obstacles to the movement of goods within a Member 
State, such as regional tariffs; second, the Court has been willing to apply 
the Treaty even to clearly internal situations when the legislation at issue 
was, in itself and in the abstract, contrary to EC law.
2.2.1.1 Regional frontiers and intrastate obstacles
The ﬁ rst line of cases, in particular Simitzi, Lancry and Carbonati 
Apuani,81 dealt with obstacles to the movement of goods within a single 
Member State. In these cases, the Court explicitly extended the scope of 
Treaty rules on pecuniary restrictions (Articles 23 and 25 EC) from cross-
border trade to intra-Community trade in general: 
Since the very principle of a customs union covers all trade in goods, 
as provided for by Article 9 of the Treaty [now Article 23 EC], it re-
quires the free movement of goods generally, as opposed to inter-
State trade alone, to be ensured within the Union.82 
79  Case 98/86 Criminal proceedings against Arthur Mathot [1987] ECR 809 paras 7-8.
80  Case C-6/01 Associação Nacional de Operadores de Máquinas Recreativas (Anomar) and 
Others v Estado português [2003] ECR I-8621 para 39. The Court left some room for confu-
sion by pointing out that the national legislation at issue can be applied both to nationals 
of other Member States and of the Member State concerned. This would suggest that the 
nationality (or place of establishment) of the parties is decisive, rather than the cross-border 
movement of goods. See s 1.3.
81  Joined cases C-485/93 and C-486/93 Maria Simitzi v Dimos Kos [1995] ECR I-2655; 
Joined cases C-363/93, C-407/93, C-408/93, C-409/93, C-410/93 and C-411/93 René 
Lancry SA v Direction Générale des Souanes and Société Dindar Confort, Christian Ah-Son, 
Paul Chevassus-Marche, Société Conforéunion and Société Dindar Autos v Conseil Régional 
de la Réunion and Direction Régionale des Douanes de la Réunion [1994] ECR I-3957; Case 
C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani Srl v Comune di Carrara [2004] ECR I-8027.
82  Lancry (n 81) para 29. A somewhat dubious justiﬁ cation for a similar holding in Car-
bonati Apuani (n 81) is: ‘If Articles 23 EC and 25 EC make express reference only to trade 
between Member States, that is because the framers of the Treaty took it for granted that 
there were no charges exhibiting the features of a customs duty in existence within the 
Member States’ (para 22). As pointed out in P Oliver, ‘Some Further Reﬂ ections on the 
Scope of Articles 28-30 (Ex 30-36) EC’ (1999) 36 CML Rev 783, 785, this makes little sense, 
if for no other reason than the duty charged in Lancry existed for years before the signing 
of the ﬁ rst Treaties.
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Thus, the Treaty also applies to cases conﬁ ned to one Member State 
whenever there is an obstacle to the movement of goods within a Member 
State.83 
The Lancry holding was further developed in Jersey Potatoes,84 
which extended the same principle to Article 29 EC, ie to non-pecuniary 
restrictions on exports. At issue were exports of potatoes from Jersey, 
a British Crown dependency, to the UK. However, for the purposes of 
the judgment, Jersey and the UK had to be treated as a single Member 
State. Thus, the ‘exports’ were, as a matter of law, intrastate movement of 
goods. Nevertheless, the situation was not held to be purely internal.85
This extension of the Treaty rules on free movement of goods to 
obstacles to intrastate trade can be explained in several ways. First, a 
measure might in practice also be applied to goods being exported to 
other Member States. In such a case, it is clear that there is no internal 
situation. Second, it could be practically difﬁ cult to tell the difference 
between goods in domestic trade and goods which are being imported 
or exported.86 Thus, removing the internal situation rule helps us avoid 
false negatives. 
Thirdly, and most interestingly, duties on goods shipped from one 
region of a Member State to another have to be removed, since ‘the cus-
toms union necessarily implies that the free movement of goods should 
be ensured ... within the customs union’.87 This justiﬁ cation is conceptu-
al in nature, and not related to any technical arguments on policing trade 
in goods. As argued by AG Sharpston in French community and Walloon 
government vs Flemish government, this argument could be extended (at 
least) to all cases of regional frontiers or other intrastate obstacles to free 
movement, not only to the free movement of goods.88 The Court has not, 
however, followed the Advocate General in this respect, considering Flan-
83  This was qualiﬁ ed by invoking Article 14(2) EC which deﬁ nes the internal market as ‘an 
area without internal frontiers’, Carbonati Apuani (n 81) para 23. 
84  Case C-293/02 Jersey Produce Marketing Organisation Ltd v States of Jersey and Jersey 
Potato Export Marketing Board [2005] ECR I-9543. See also Tryfonidou, ‘Case C-293/02, 
Jersey Produce Marketing Organisation Ltd v States of Jersey and Jersey Potato Export 
Marketing Board, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 November 2005, not yet 
reported, case note’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1723, 1738-9, who argues that Jersey Potatoes 
does not in fact extend the application of Article 29 EC to goods travelling from Jersey to 
the UK.
85  Case C-293/02 (n 84) para 76. AG Léger in the same case argued the opposite quite 
strongly. See his opinion in para 107 and those that follow.
86  Oliver (n 82) 785. 
87  Case C-30/01 Commission v UK [2003] ECR I-9481 paras 52-53. Therefore, Tryfonidou 
argues, the case should be understood in light of its speciﬁ c facts.
88  AG Sharpston in C-212/06 (n 17) para 129.
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ders’ refusal to grant social security beneﬁ ts to workers residing in the 
French Community to be an internal situation.
2.2.1.2 Pistre and restrictive domestic regulations
Article 28 EC’s prohibition of non-pecuniary restrictions on imports 
is where the provisions on the free movement of goods interface most 
strongly with the domestic, non-trade, policy of Member States. Internal 
situations in the context of Article 28 have been dealt with in a separate 
body of case law.
This second line of case law weakening the role of ‘internal’ situ-
ations in free movement of goods law stems from Pistre.89 At issue in 
this case was French legislation reserving the use of the word ‘mountain 
product’ to agricultural products made in a certain way and in certain re-
gions within France. It applied both to domestic and imported products, 
but imported products could never fulﬁ l the criterion. Thus, the legisla-
tion was directly discriminatory and could have been easily challenged by 
any importer. The applicants, however, were domestic producers. What 
was at stake was an internal situation, though the challenged national 
legislation would also clearly be considered a restriction of free movement 
of goods in a cross-border case.
The Court’s solution was to explicitly hold Article 28 applicable be-
cause the national provision ‘may also have effects on the free movement 
of goods between Member States’, even if all the facts of the ‘speciﬁ c 
case before the national court are conﬁ ned to a single Member State’.90 
The Court focused on the cross-border effects of the restrictive legislation 
rather than the cross-border elements of the facts. 
This case could be seen as simply pronouncing, in the abstract, 
whether certain kinds of national legislation could withstand the scrutiny 
of Article 28, and then leaving it to the national court to decide whether 
this fact could be pleaded in a purely internal case. The distinction be-
tween external and internal cases is, however, never clearly made. 
89  Joined cases C-321/94, C-322/94, C-323/94 and C-324/94 Criminal proceedings 
against Jacques Pistre (C-321/94), Michèle Barthes (C-322/94), Yves Milhau (C-323/94) and 
Didier Oberti (C-324/94) [1997] ECR I-2343.
90  Pistre (n 89) para 44. Oliver (n 82) 787-788 argues on the other hand that Pistre should 
apply only to non-internal situations as a matter of EC law. See however Case C-379/98, 
PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG, in the presence of Windpark Reußenköge III GmbH 
and Land Schleswig-Holstein [2001] ECR I-2099 paras 69-70, where arguably the Court 
repeated the approach in Pistre.
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As argued by Tryfonidou,91 Pistre indeed removes the problem of ar-
bitrariness in the application of internal market rules. By focusing on the 
restrictive legislation itself, rather than the facts to which the legislation 
was applied, it accomplished two things: it got rid of a potentially restric-
tive piece of legislation, and it (potentially) caught internal cases as well, 
thus removing the reverse discrimination problem. But we could easily 
imagine a case where this approach would not help domestic producers. 
What if France adopted the identical legislation as in Pistre, but provided 
that all imported goods, unlike goods produced in other regions within 
France, could freely use the designation ‘mountain products’ with no for-
malities? This would be directly discriminatory against domestic produc-
ers. But is there room in the Court’s present case law to condemn this 
legislation under the Treaty?
This hypothetical case reveals a paradox. If they want to treat inter-
nal situations independently from EC law requirements, Member States 
are better off discriminating against them directly and explicitly, rather 
than adopting the same general rule for both external and internal situa-
tions. As long as internal situations are deﬁ ned in a nuanced way so as to 
avoid any cross-border implications, it would not be possible to say that 
the legislation as such can potentially affect imports. If faced with such 
a case, it seems that the ECJ would be left with no option other than to 
tackle the problem of reverse discrimination directly, which at this point 
it does not seem prepared to do.
Pistre might be seen as an outlier, since the case law normally de-
cides whether cases are internal on the basis of their speciﬁ c facts. How-
ever, the approach gives food for thought. If the nature of the legislation, 
measure or activity challenged before the courts is such that it has cross-
border ramiﬁ cations, could that not sufﬁ ce to supply a cross-border ele-
ment? As it turns out, there are at least two other areas where something 
similar holds: competition law and public procurement law. 
2.2.2 Examples to follow? - competition law and public procurement
EC competition and public procurement law are examples of more 
substantive approaches to regulating competition within the internal mar-
ket. Similarly to Pistre, in these areas the Court focuses on the cross-bor-
der effects of the disputed measure or activity in general, rather than on 
the cross-border elements in the case at hand. Such an approach is more 
in line with the goal of ﬁ ltering activities or measures which substantially 
91  A Tryfonidou, ‘The outer limits of Article 28 EC: Purely internal situations and the de-
velopment of the Court’s approach through the years’, available at <http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1029248> 13-15.
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affect intra-Community trade and competition, and it also avoids many 
cases of reverse discrimination. 
In both areas, the Court could conceivably apply the internal situa-
tion rule. Public procurement law is a speciﬁ c application of free move-
ment rules and the internal situation argument has indeed appeared in 
the case law. In competition law, the ‘trade effects’ test fulﬁ ls a similar 
role. However, the Court’s approach is radically different from standard 
free movement cases. 
2.2.2.1 Competition law
Provisions of the EC Treaty on anti-competitive agreements (Article 
81 EC), abuses of a dominant position (Article 82 EC) and state aids (Arti-
cle 87 EC) extend to all anti-competitive behaviour, even that which does 
not involve an express cross-border element, as long as it affects trade 
between Member States.92 Similarly to the internal situation rule, the 
trade effects requirement is meant to protect Member State competences, 
as it ‘incorporates the notion of subsidiarity’.93 Consequently, just as in 
‘purely internal’ cases within the context of free movement provisions, 
some anti-competitive behaviour passes under the radar of Community 
law, and can be dealt with solely on the basis of the law of the Member 
State concerned.
Crucially, however, when examining whether anti-competitive activ-
ity is able to affect the internal market, what counts are not its cross-
border characteristics, but only its general ability to have an impact on 
competition. It is the size of the ﬁ sh that is important, not how far it has 
travelled within the pond. Thus, if a company is based, has ofﬁ ces, em-
ploys workers, makes contracts, sells products, and in all other respects 
does business in one Member State only, it could still be found guilty of 
a violation of EC competition law, as long as a ‘substantial part’ of the 
internal market is affected. This will be particularly true if the effects of 
anti-competitive conduct are felt outside of the Member State, either by 
inﬂ uencing the pattern of interstate trade or by interfering with the struc-
ture of competition within the internal market.94 Thus, the Court held in 
92  To use as an example the text of Article 82 EC: ‘Any abuse by one or more undertak-
ings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall 
be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade be-
tween Member States.’ For the Court’s understanding, see Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche 
Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission of the European Communities [1983] ECR 3461 
paras 102-105. See also Maduro (n 3) in n 28.
93  Jones and Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd edn Oxford 1987) 
89.
94  Jones and Sufrin (n 93) 287.
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Hugin that ‘Community law covers any agreement or any practice which 
is capable of constituting a threat to freedom of trade between Member 
States in a manner which might harm the attainment of the objectives of 
a single market between the Member States.’95
Apart from the fact that cross-border elements are not discussed as 
such, there are two other differences between the Court’s case law on free 
movement provisions and competition provisions. First, the inquiry here 
focuses directly on the abuse or restriction of Community law rather than 
on the parties or other elements of the case. In the free movement con-
text, this would be equivalent to examining restrictive national legislation 
regardless of the parties’ cross-border movement.96 Second, the require-
ment of trade effects in competition law is easily satisﬁ ed, since a ‘direct 
or indirect, actual or potential’ inﬂ uence on the pattern of interstate trade 
sufﬁ ces.97
It is not completely clear why the ‘trade effects’ test and the internal 
situation rule should be interpreted so differently. While, broadly speak-
ing, the scope of competition rules is not identical to that of free move-
ment rules,98 in this speciﬁ c respect it is hard to justify the differences. 
In both areas, the EU’s policy is essentially market-based integration. 
Notions of trade and competition within the internal market are inter-
linked: cross-border trade is an important consideration in competition 
law, just as cross-border competition underlies the interpretation of free 
movement rules.99 
95  Case 22/78 Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v Commission [1979] 
ECR 1869 para 17. See also the Commission’s Guidelines on the Effect of Trade Concept 
Contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2004] OJ (C101/81). 
96  See s 2.2.1.2.
97  Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière (LTM) v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (MBU) [1966] 
ECR 235 para 7. It has also been held (Case 246/86 SC Belasco and others v Commission of 
the European Communities [1989] ECR 2117 paras 33-34) that a cartel limited to the mar-
keting of products in only one Member State affects interstate trade. However, the opposite 
was true in Joined cases C-215/96 and C-216/96 Carlo Bagnasco and Others v Banca Po-
polare di Novara soc coop arl (BNP) (C-215/96) and Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia 
SpA (Carige) (C-216/96) [1999] ECR I-135 paras 51-52. See Jones and Sufrin (n 93) 174.
98  It was held, for example, that activities excluded from the scope of free movement provi-
sions may still fall within the scope of competition rules - Case C-519/04 P David Meca-
Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991 para 31.
99  Thus, Article 2 EC states: ‘The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a com-
mon market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies 
or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community ... a high 
degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance’.
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2.2.2.2 Public procurement law
Public procurement law is an even more striking example of incon-
sistency in the scope of application of the provisions of Community law. 
It is much harder to distinguish from ‘normal’ free movement cases than 
competition law, because public procurement in EC law is simply a spe-
ciﬁ c application of Articles 49 (free provision of services) and 43 (freedom 
of establishment) EC. To explain the inconsistencies here, let us take up 
again the example of a company conﬁ ned to a single Member State in all 
its activities.
If that ﬁ ctional company wins a public tender within its Member 
State, and the contract notice was not published in the EU Ofﬁ cial Jour-
nal as required by Directive 2004/18,100 there might be a legal challenge. 
Because the tender is not publicised on an EU-wide basis, however, the 
challenger is likely to be a domestic competitor, possibly making the case 
an internal one. Nevertheless, the Directive will almost certainly be held 
to apply, even if no foreign competitor complains, as long as the contract 
amount exceeds the threshold values laid down by the Directive.101 In 
fact, even if the contract falls below the thresholds and the Directive can-
not be applied, the contract award is still subject to Articles 49 and 43 
EC, as well as the general principles of non-discrimination and transpar-
ency.102 This holds true even if all the facts are conﬁ ned to one Member 
State.
It is clear why this kind of thinking makes sense. If the internal situ-
ation rule was applied, Member States could escape liability by doing ex-
actly what the public procurement directives are meant to restrain - with-
holding the EU-wide publication of tenders. By making sure that only 
domestic companies can participate, they would be artiﬁ cially keeping all 
situations internal, and thus outside the scope of Community law. 
For these reasons, it might seem surprising that the internal situa-
tion argument has appeared in the Court’s case law even once. In RI.SAN, 
an Italian company which previously ran a local waste management serv-
ice challenged a municipality’s decision to form a new company which 
would run these operations in the future. The Court refused to apply 
Articles (now) 43 and 49 EC, stating that RI.SAN ‘has its seat in Italy and 
does not operate on the Italian market in reliance on freedom of estab-
100  Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2004] OJ 
L134/23, 35.
101  Directive 2004/18/EC (n 100) art 7.
102  Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG 
[2005] ECR I-8585 para 46.
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lishment or freedom to provide services’.103 Therefore all the facts were 
conﬁ ned to Italy and the discussion stopped. 
A consistent application of such a holding could have made EC pub-
lic procurement law much less effective. Presumably, this is why it did 
not take long to see a different approach from the Court in Coname, 
another Italian case, and one with almost identical facts. To answer the 
question of whether the contract award at issue was contrary to Articles 
43 and 49 EC, the Court relied on potential, or implied, competition: 
... in so far as the concession in question may also be of interest to 
an undertaking located in a Member State other than the Member 
State of the Comune di Cingia de’ Botti, the award, in the absence 
of any transparency, of that concession to an undertaking located in 
the latter Member State amounts to a difference in treatment to the 
detriment of the undertaking located in the other Member State.104 
In other words, because of hypothetical discrimination against an 
imagined competitor, the applicant was able to obtain a remedy.105
Building on this judgment, the Court rejected the internal situation 
argument even more forcefully in Parking Brixen.106 In the absence of 
advertisements for the competition, the Court stated ‘there is discrimi-
nation, at least potentially, against undertakings of the other Member 
States which are prevented from making use of the freedom to provide 
services and of the freedom of establishment’.107
103  Case C-108/98 RI.SAN. Srl v Comune di Ischia, Italia Lavoro SpA and Ischia Ambiente 
SpA [1999] ECR I-05219 paras 21-22. See also Andrea Biondi, ‘In and Out of the Internal 
Market: Recent Developments on the Principle of Free Movement’ (1999/2000) 19 Ybk Eur 
L 469, 484. 
104  Case C-231/03 Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v Comune di Cingia de’ Botti [2005] 
ECR I-7287 para 17.
105  It is interesting that Advocate General Stix-Hackl was more cautious. While noting the 
special nature of public procurement, pointing to the problem of potential competition and 
thus putting into question the holding in RI.SAN, she focused on the ability of the Court to 
answer the national court’s question even if the situation is purely internal. Opinion of AG 
Stix-Hackl, Coname (n 104) para 21.
106  Parking Brixen (n 102). In neither of these cases did the Court expressly mention its 
holding in RI.SAN, nor distinguish the cases in any way.
107  Parking Brixen (n 102) para 55. The Court is able to solve the internal situation co-
nundrum by relying on hypothetical competitors from other Member States. An interesting 
question is, however, whether domestic companies could be directly protected by arguing 
that non-transparency adversely affects their efforts to compete across the internal market. 
The assumption that they are favoured by non-transparent public procurement procedures 
simply because they are established in the same Member State as the contracting authority 
is rather unrealistic. Thus, in public procurement, the Court is closer to economic reality 
simply because of its use of a more extensive proxy, not because of a particularly wide un-
derstanding of the fundamental freedoms and cross-border competition. In any event, after 
Coname and Parking Brixen, it seems that the only way for a contracting authority to escape 
58 M. Mataija: Internal Situations in Community Law: An Uncertain Safeguard of Competences...
What is the relevance of Coname and Parking Brixen for other as-
pects of free movement law? While it seems very speciﬁ c, the outcome in 
public procurement cases is, again, similar to Pistre. Instead of focusing 
on the parties of the speciﬁ c case and their cross-border activities (or lack 
thereof), the Court looked directly at the activity or restriction at issue. 
In Pistre, the restriction consisted in discriminatory legislation, and in 
Coname and Parking Brixen in the award of a public contract.108 
These cases also share a common feature with the competition law 
approach outlined above. The focus is on the restriction that is being 
challenged: legislation and measures of the Member States, or private 
anti-competitive conduct. In competition law, this is achieved on a more 
systematic level, while public procurement uses the proxy of hypothetical 
cross-border competition. The Court’s analysis moves in a similar direc-
tion. This does not ﬁ t well with the Court’s usual approach to internal 
situations, which is to look at the facts of the case at hand and search for 
links to cross-border movement. 
The examples of public procurement and competition law, along with 
Pistre, provide hints of a possible different solution to the internal situ-
ation puzzle. Before addressing this solution, however, it is important to 
consider a separate line of case law in which the Court has been willing to 
give an interpretation of Community law, regardless of the cross-border 
implications or elements, through the back door of the legal systems of 
the Member States.
2.3 Answering the question - a procedural remedy in the context of 
Article 234 EC?
Even in purely internal cases, the Court has been willing to give na-
tional courts guidance on points of Community law within a preliminary 
reference procedure (Article 234 EC). Again, its approach has been less 
than strict: even the slightest justiﬁ cation has sufﬁ ced for the Court to 
give an interpretation of EC provisions.
liability for non-transparent award procedures under EC law is to show that the contract 
was of ‘very modest economic interest’, or that there is some other special circumstance, so 
that undertakings from other Member States would have no interest in it (Coname n 105 
para 20).
108  One difference is that in public procurement law, non-discrimination is the mandate 
of contracting authorities. It would be difﬁ cult to partition their task in a way which would 
allow them to discriminate against domestic companies without potentially affecting com-
panies from other Member States. It would be interesting, however, to see the outcome of 
a case in which a Member State, for example, expressly reserved certain remedies only to 
companies established in other Member States to the detriment of their own companies. 
Would this fall under the scope of the Treaty and/or the public procurement directives?
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There are two lines of case law on which this is based. The ﬁ rst, 
starting with Dzodzi,109 allows the Court to provide an answer even in 
cases where EU law cannot be applied, as long as the relevant national 
legislation refers to EU law in some way (eg by stating that the law is in-
tended to implement an EU directive).110 This reference does not have to 
be explicit and its strength can vary. It is enough that the two sets of leg-
islation ‘adopt the same solutions’.111 Because national law incorporates 
the solutions of Community law, it makes sense to give an interpretation 
of Community law to the national court.
The second relevant line of case law, starting with Guimont,112 is 
speciﬁ cally linked to reverse discrimination. The Court assumes jurisdic-
tion to give an answer if the national court has a duty under its own law 
to prevent reverse discrimination. Thus, if the national court is bound to 
treat internal situations and those falling under the scope of Community 
law equally, the Court should be able to explain what would happen if the 
case was governed by Community law. In Guimont and Cipolla,113 how-
ever, the Court approached this quite broadly, giving an answer without 
even inquiring whether such a provision exists at all in the law of the 
Member State concerned. 
It is hard not to agree with criticisms114 that this approach goes 
against the normal logic of the preliminary reference procedure. If the 
109  Joined cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Massam Dzodzi v Belgium [1990] ECR I-3763 
para 36. Other cases include Case C-28/95 A Leur-Bloem v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/
Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2 [1997] ECR I-4161 para 25; Case C-130/95 Bernd Giloy v 
Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1997] ECR I-4291 para 21; and Case C-1/99 Koﬁ sa 
Italia Srl v Ministero delle Finanze, Servizio della Riscossione dei Tributi - Concessione Provin-
cia di Genova - San Paolo Riscossioni Genova SpA [2001] ECR I-207 para 32.
110  The same is true in competition law. See Case C-217/05 Confederación Española de 
Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía Española de Petróleos SA [2006] ECR 
I-11987 para 20.
111  See also Case C-3/04 Poseidon Chartering BV v Marianne Zeeschip VOF and Others 
[2006] ECR I-2505 para 16.
112  Case C-448/9 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Pierre Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663 
paras 22-23.
113  In Joined cases C-94/04 and C-202/04 Federico Cipolla v Rosaria Fazari, née Portolese 
(C-94/04) and Stefano Macrino and Claudia Capoparte v Roberto Meloni (C-202/04) [2006] 
ECR I-11421, the parties were Italian lawyers in dispute with Italian clients about legal fees 
for legal services rendered completely within Italy regarding Italian cases. However, the ECJ 
held that the national legislation - subject to the national court’s ﬁ nding of proportionality 
- could be contrary to Article 49.
114  Ritter (n 38) 698-702. AG Jacobs in his Opinion in Case C-306/99 Banque interna-
tionale pour l’Afrique occidentale SA (BIAO) v Finanzamt für Großunternehmen in Hamburg 
[2003] ECR I-1, similarly stated: ‘it is difﬁ cult to see how it serves the purpose of Article 
234 EC, which confers jurisdiction on the Court to give preliminary rulings concerning the 
validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community, for the Court to 
interpret Community provisions in so far as they are taken over by national legislation and 
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purpose is simply to provide a persuasive opinion that the national court 
may or may not follow, then such an interpretation could be given in all 
cases coming before the Court. What is the signiﬁ cance of the fact that 
domestic law might prohibit reverse discrimination, or even of the fact 
that EC law was invoked in implementing measures? 
This does not exhaust the problems of the Guimont approach. It is 
also difﬁ cult to distinguish these cases from Pistre, or the public pro-
curement cases. In each of these cases, Member States adopt potentially 
restrictive legislation or measures which could be examined under free 
movement rules. In each of these cases, the parties and other elements of 
the dispute seem conﬁ ned to a single Member State. 
Yet, the outcomes are wildly different. In Pistre and (with a slightly 
different justiﬁ cation) Parking Brixen, the Court goes for a straightfor-
ward application of the Treaty. In Guimont and Cipolla, the Court holds 
the speciﬁ c cases to be outside the scope of EC provisions but gives a 
non-binding interpretation anyway. As the case law stands currently, it 
is difﬁ cult to predict which of these approaches the Court will use in any 
given case.
3 A more substantive link with the internal market?
As indicated by several examples (section 2), there are two basic 
problems with the Court’s case law on internal situations. First, it has 
been inconsistent across various provisions of the Treaty and second-
ary law.115 Moreover, the doctrine is too often focused on formalistic and 
factually contingent links to free movement, potentially neglecting to ad-
dress cases where the dispute deals with serious impediments to free 
movement. Reverse discrimination is the most obvious, but not the only 
unwanted consequence. An overly strong rule on internal situations can 
also allow many restrictive measures to go unchecked, simply because 
of a formalistic obstacle which, as we have seen,116 does not do much to 
protect Member State competences.
applied to a situation manifestly outside the scope of those provisions and hence beyond 
their intended reach’ (para 59).
115  Much has been written on the convergence between the four freedoms and the need 
for a similar standard of review across these freedoms (goods, persons, services, capital). 
See eg L Woods, Free Movement of Goods and Services within the European Community 
(Ashgate, 2004) 293-297 and the works cited therein. Certainly, there are differences in the 
way Treaty provisions dealing with free movement are framed and applied, not to mention 
secondary law adopted on their basis. However, none of these differences speaks in favour 
of a fundamentally different approach to the treatment of internal situations.
116  See s 1.3.
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I do not suggest that this problem can go away at the stroke of a 
pen, or that the internal situation rule should be abolished. However, the 
deﬁ nition of internal situations could be made more consistent and more 
substantive. In suggesting such an approach, I start from two points.
First, the internal situation rule is one of several instruments of judi-
cial restraint meant to protect the regulatory autonomy of Member States 
from excessive interventions based on EC internal market rules. Second, 
as argued above in section 1.2.1.3, the rule is not an overarching prin-
ciple of Community law, but is relevant only for internal market law, 
more speciﬁ cally, for provisions on free movement. These two proposi-
tions enable us to view the internal situation rule mainly on the basis of 
two benchmarks: protection of Member State competences and internal 
market regulation. 
One way to address the problems outlined above would be to tackle 
the problem of reverse discrimination directly, perhaps with the aid of 
the provisions on EU citizenship or fundamental rights. However, this 
solution has not been the focus of this article. For present purposes, it 
sufﬁ ces to say that the Court has not been receptive to this idea, and has 
rejected it again in quite recent cases such as Metock and French com-
munity and Walloon government v Flemish government.117
Another route could be to attempt to pull as many cases as possible 
into the net of Community law by thinking creatively when looking for a 
cross-border element in their facts.118 If the parties are merely deterred 
from exercising their free movement rights,119 or if they are treated less 
favourably because of previous or current movement, the cross-border re-
quirement could be fulﬁ lled. Cases where the European Court is willing to 
answer the national court’s questions even though the case is admittedly 
internal, acting under the assumption that there can be a solution for re-
verse discrimination under domestic law, can be seen in this light as well. 
This approach would extend Community law protection to a wider 
range of situations, but would still not solve the problem of the unpre-
dictability of what would be deemed internal. This is all the more so 
because some of the inroads the Court was willing to make are limited 
to speciﬁ c subject matter, even though they could be applied across the 
board. For example, regional frontiers could conceivably be relevant not 
only for the free movement of goods (as in Lancry) but also other market 
freedoms (such as in French community and Walloon government v Flem-
ish government). 
117  Metock (n 4) and C-212/06 (n 4).
118  See s 2.1.1.
119  See s 2.1.2.
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In addition, in this approach, cases where the restriction at issue 
truly affects the internal market can still pass under the radar because of 
the lack of any cross-border elements, whereas even tenuous cross-bor-
der elements could justify a case with little actual impact on free move-
ment.120
These problems indicate that the deﬁ nition of internal situations 
should be more substantive, and more attuned to the values which are 
actually at stake: protection of Member State competences and effective 
regulation of the internal market. Pistre, competition law and public pro-
curement law can serve as an inspiration for an approach which would 
serve these interests better.
In this approach, the cross-border implications of the law, admin-
istrative measure or private activity challenged as a possible breach of 
Community provisions would also be taken into account when deciding 
whether a case was purely internal. If it is clear that the measure is, at 
least in some circumstances, contrary to EC law (speciﬁ cally, to the free 
movement provisions of the EC Treaty or secondary law), the principle of 
supremacy requires it to be put aside by the national court. The speciﬁ c 
facts of the case at hand should not be decisive, as long as the applicant 
is truly affected by the illegal measure. This would enable a number of 
trade-restrictive measures to be examined under Community law, even 
if there are no other factual cross-border elements. Thus, the internal 
market could function more effectively, and a number of cases of reverse 
discrimination would be addressed.
This approach would require a substantial change of direction in the 
case law. In addition, it might seem to subject many more situations to 
Community law. However, it should be pointed out that this interpreta-
tion only applies to measures which could, in the abstract, affect free 
movement. This means that Member States would still be able to remove 
internal situations from the scope of EU law, as long as they do so explic-
itly and clearly. For example, they could align their legislation with the 
requirements of EC law but restrict the application of the legislation to 
cross-border situations (however many difﬁ culties there may be in mak-
ing this distinction, see section 1.3).
Thus, this approach would still enable the Court to safeguard Mem-
ber State competences by declaring Community law inapplicable where 
neither the facts of the case at hand nor the restriction being challenged 
have cross-border implications. Moreover, even if a measure can be chal-
lenged, there are still a number of mechanisms of judicial restraint which 
would enable the Court to abstain from passing judgment and leave the 
120  Opinion of AG Sharpston in C-212/06 (n 17) para 91. See also Tryfonidou (n 91) 6-7.
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matter to the Member State concerned. Most notably, as it has done 
before,121 it could hold the measures to be ‘too uncertain and indirect’ 
to affect free movement. This would be akin to a de minimis test (and 
not unlike the ‘trade effects’ test in competition law). Some cases where 
movement does take place should be left to national law because of their 
limited signiﬁ cance or slight cross-border implications. In addition, the 
Keck jurisprudence gave the Court the necessary ammunition to remove 
from scrutiny various non-discriminatory measures which do not affect 
the pattern of trade between Member States.122 All this makes a strict, 
facts-based version of the internal situation rule not only ill-suited, but 
also unnecessary for the preservation of Member State competences. 
Conclusion
Although there are good reasons for its existence, the application of 
the internal situation rule has been fraught with difﬁ culties. What I have 
tried to show is that the rule should, ﬁ rst of all, be construed narrowly. 
It is only relevant for the application of those provisions of EC or EU law 
that require some sort of movement or cross-border element. Therefore, it 
should not be thought of as a general principle of Community law.
The rule does not perform well in light of either of the two competing 
interests: preservation of Member State competences or effective regula-
tion of the internal market. It does not make it easier for Member States to 
regulate independently, except if they make detailed distinctions between 
cases where movement is or is not present. Second, the way in which the 
rule is applied by the Court has been inconsistent across various provi-
sions of EC internal market law and disconnected from the substance of 
cross-border trade and movement, focusing instead on contingent and 
often irrelevant factors related to the speciﬁ c case of the applicants. 
This is why I propose the extension of the approach in Pistre, inspired 
also by the case law on public procurement and by the trade effects re-
quirement from competition law. This approach would apply Community 
law to a number of cases where the effectiveness of the internal market 
is substantially affected. It would allow Member States to regulate truly 
internal situations independently - but without inﬂ icting collateral dam-
age on freedom of movement.
121  Among others, see Case C-69/88 H Krantz GmbH & Co v Ontvanger der Directe Belastin-
gen and Netherlands State [1990] ECR I-583 para 11; Case C-44/98 BASF AG v Präsident 
des Deutschen Patentamts [1999] ECR I-6269 para 16; and the Order in Case C-431/01 
Philippe Mertens v Belgium [2002] ECR I-7073 para 34.
122  See n 15.
